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We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash
equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex mono-
tonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive sig-
nals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of
conditional strategies is asymptotically stable only if it represents a
strict (correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated equilibria that
cannot be represented by an asymptotically stable signal contingent
strategy. For generic games it is shown that if signals are endogenous
but no player has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating
process and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable,
then and only then, the outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.
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11 Introduction and Related Literature
Consider a situation of strategic interaction in which agents perceive signals
before they choose their strategy. Restricting the general setup of Aumann
(1974), we demand that all agents share common prior on the distribution of
the signals. Given the own signal and given the conditional distribution of
the opponents’ signals, each agent optimally chooses a strategy. Finally, sup-
pose that there is common knowledge of rationality. According to Aumann
(1987), a resulting outcome must be a correlated equilibrium. Due to the
potential correlation between signals, a correlated equilibrium does not need
to be a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, a situation of strategic interaction without
signals seems artiﬁcial – signals are all around us in the real world, we can
hardly avoid perceiving them and then condition our behavior on them in
many situations. For example, in a ﬁnancial market agents may receive sig-
nals on the value of some asset that are correlated. Several ﬁrms competing
on a market for some consumption good may receive correlated information
on the parametrization of the demand function. Consumers observe sig-
nals displaying information on the quality of some good when planning their
consumption. Football fans perceive signals concerning the success of their
favorite team within some tournament and condition their betting behavior
on this information.
Rationality in the sense of Aumann (1987) requires that agents under-
stand the underlying probability space and that this is commonly known.
Here, the concept of correlated equilibrium is supported from the perspec-
tive of bounded rationality. We assume evolutionary dynamics on the game
in which agents receive signals and show that states persisting over time in
the presence of small mutations are correlated equilibria – and therefore may
be non-Nash outcomes. Before the model is described in detail in the next
section, I discuss the concept of evolution. In his survey on adaptive heuris-
tics, Hart (2005) describes evolutionary dynamics as one extreme of bounded
2rationality: individuals’ behavior is completely deterministic. The concept
of evolutionary game theory originates from biology; see Dawkins (1990) or
Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull (1996) for socio-economic interpretations. Ratio-
nality is imposed on an aggregate level: strategies with higher relative success
spread faster. Evolutionary game theory contributes by showing that even
if agents are boundedly rational, certain outcomes predicted by concepts
requiring rationality persist over time.
This paper characterizes the set of correlated equilibria that persist over
time, given boundedly rational agents. The ﬁrst part of the chapter assumes
an exogenous and stationary process of signal generation. A set of signal
contingent strategies is asymptotically stable with respect to convex mono-
tonic dynamics1, if it is a strict equilibrium set2 of the game with signals.
Given this selection, I consider endogenous signals. A signal generating pro-
cess is robust, if no population has an incentive to manipulate the process,
given equilibrium choice of the signal contingent strategies. I show for generic
games that a signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable and the sig-
nal generating processs is robust, if and only if the induced outcome is a strict
Nash equilibrium. For the special case of the traditional example that has
an equilibrium outcome with payoﬀs outside the convex hull of Nash-payoﬀs,
the Chicken game, I show that a correlated equilibrium has robust signals if
and only if it induces payoﬀs that lie inside the convex hull of Nash-payoﬀs.
The remainder of this section classiﬁes this paper to the literature. It is
well understood that the aggregate can display some rationality. Ritzberger
and Weibull (1995) show that only strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically
stable in the multipopulation replicator dynamics. For asymmetric games
(animal conﬂicts), Selten (1980) shows that evolutionary stable strategies
must be strict Nash equilibria. I make use of a concept introduced by Balken-
borg (1994), strict equilibrium set. Each element of a strict equilibrium set
1Hofbauer and Weibull (1996)
2Balkenborg (1994)
3is a Nash equilibrium, the set is closed under mixed best replies. Balkenborg
and Schlag (2007) show asymptotic stability of restpoints within this set for
general asymmetric games.3 I rely on the concept of strict equilibrium set
to characterize sets of correlated equilibria that are asymptotically stable.
Lenzo and Sarver (2006) build up a model of subpopulations in which agents
are matched according to a distribution over the set of subpopulations. They
show that every interior4 Lyapunov stable state is equivalent to a correlated
equilibrium. Their model is inspired by the work of Mailath et al. (1997)
who show that equilibria in a static model of local interactions coincide with
correlated equilibria in the original game. In both models the correlation
device is a “matching technology” with which agents of diﬀerent populations
are matched non-uniformly. I show that Lenzo and Sarver (2006) is a special
case of the general model considered here, if one chooses a particular signal
generating process. Cripps (1991) analyzes a two player model in which in a
ﬁrst stage nature randomly allocates row or column to the players and in a
second step assigns one role of a ﬁnite set of roles to each player. He shows
that an ESS in the symmetric game yields a distribution over the set of out-
comes that is a strict correlated equilibrium. I abstain from analyzing the
symmetrization and extend his model to dynamic analysis. Kim and Wong
(2007) deﬁne evolutionary stable correlation for symmetric 2×2-games. They
apply a special signal space, I discuss this matter after introducing the static
model. Finally, we consider endogenous signals. I imagine situations, in
which some agents exercise control over the generation of signals. Attention
is not restricted to cheap talk games, situations in which a signal consists
of a message of each player. In such a case, the player can manipulate a
part of the signal. I consider players who can replace a signal entirely and
3Other setwise concepts deﬁned for symmetric one population games are introduced by
Balkenborg and Schlag (2001) and Thomas (1985). Cressman (2003) also elaborates on
the strict equilibrium set.
4Interiority in the subpopulation model means that the state is interior for each sub-
population. It is more stringent than interiority in our case.
4model this by considering the choice of probability distributions over the set
of signal generating elementary events. I characterize the set of strategies in
the original game for evolutionary dynamics of signalcontingent strategies, if
no population has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process.
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 sets up the model, section 3
lists propositions which are already available in the literature and which We
transfer to this model to characterize asymptotically stable sets of correlated
equilibria. Section 4 gives some examples. Section 5 shows the generalization
of the subpopulation model of Lenzo and Sarver (2006), section 6 character-
izes the set of stable outcomes that have a robust signal generating process
and the appendix collects the remaining proofs.
2 Model
2.1 Static Model
We give a brief description of the model before we proceed to deﬁne it for-
mally. At each point of time, nature randomly and independently draws a
tuple of agents from a ﬁxed set of inﬁnite populations. A signal generat-
ing process reveals information to each of the active agents, this information
may be correlated. Each agent chooses a strategy to interact with the other
agents in a normal form game. Each agent is characterized by a rule that
prescribes the strategic choice given the received signal. The resulting payoﬀ
determines wether the applied rule spreads in the population.
Let Γ = {N,S,f} be a ﬁnite game in normal form where N = {1,...,N} is
the set of population, S = ×i∈NSi and Si = {si
1,...,si
mi} is population i’s
ﬁnite set of pure strategies and f : S → RN is a utility or ﬁtness function.
Let Σi = ∆(Si) be the set of probability measures on Si and let ˆ Σi be a ﬁnite
subset of Σi that contains the vertices of Σi. Let Σ = ×i∈IΣi be the set of
product measures on S, deﬁne ˆ Σ = ×i∈Iˆ Σi accordingly. ∆ = ∆(S) is the set
5of all probability measures on S. Denote by s−i = (s1,...,si−1,si+1,...,sN)
a vector of strategies without the one of population i and by S−i = ×j∈N\{i}Sj
the Cartesian product of all but i’s strategy spaces. Deﬁne Σ−i = ×j∈N\{i}Σj
and ∆−i = ∆
 
×j∈N\{i}Sj
. I extend f to the space of mixed strategies,




j∈N σj(sj) ∀ i ∈ N.
A Strategy si ∈ Si is dominated if there exists some mixed strategy σi ∈ Σi
such that fi(si,σ−i) ≤ fi(σi,σ−i) ∀ σ−i ∈ Σ−i, with strict inequality for at
least one σ−i. If the inequality is strict for all σ−i, si is strictly dominated.
It is immediate to show that if si is dominated then there is a dominating
strategy σi with σi(si) = 0.
A strategy tuple σ = (σi,σ−i) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in Γ, if ∀ i ∈
N, fi(σi,σ−i) − fi(si
h,σ−i) ≥ 0 ∀ si
h ∈ Si.
Following Aumann (1987), I deﬁne a probability space hΩ,A,Pi which gen-
erates signals (that are potentially correlated) on which agents can condition
their strategic choices. Both, the original game Γ and the probability space
constitute the primitives of my model. Assume Ω to be a nonempty and
ﬁnite set of generic elements ω. Let A be the powerset of Ω and let {Ai}i∈N
be a collection of partitions of Ω. Ai represents an information structure for
population i; if nature draws an elementary event ω ∈ Ω, population i knows
Ai ∈ Ai if and only if ω ∈ Ai. Since for each population i there may be
events ω,ω0 that i cannot distinguish, the agents are not able to ‘learn’ P.
Therefore, I need to assume P to be a common prior on (Ω,A). I regard P
as an objective statistic environment. Without loss of generality, I assume
that P(ω) > 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω. All subjectivity enters the model via the set of par-





I refer to an element ω ∈ Ω as a complete description of a state of the
world while an element Ai ∈ Ai is called a signal for the true state of the
world. I assume that each agent has access to some private randomization
6device that allows for independent mixing, such that any mixed strategy in
ˆ Σi is available. Wherever necessary, I assume that ˆ Σi is rich enough. Deﬁne
Ai(ω) = {Ai ∈ Ai | ω ∈ Ai} the information set available to an agent in
population i if nature draws ω. Throughout the model I make the assump-
tion that the populations’ ﬁtnesses (represented by f : S ⇒ RN) do not
depend on any ω. This is because I want to show that even if information
is payoﬀ-irrelevant, outcomes that are no Nash-equilibra of Γ can be stable
under boundedly rational behavior, if agents perceive correlated signals.
Let a rule be a mapping from the set of states to strategies, ri : Ω → ˆ Σi. I
assume for all i that ri is Ai-measurable, that is if for some ω, ri(ω) = σi
then ri(ω0) = σi ∀ ω0 ∈ Ai(ω). In words, agents cannot distinguish states
that are in the same information set A. Deﬁne as ri
si(ω) the probability
with which an agent who uses rule ri chooses strategy si given event ω,
that is ri
si(ω) = σi(si), where σi = ri(ω). Denote the ﬁnite set of all
rule-proﬁles by R. I denote the share of agents in population i apply-
ing rule ri by ρi(ri), the set of all shares in population i, ρi by ∆(Ri),
the set of all population shares ρ by ∆R = ×
i∈N
∆(Ri). As before, I de-
note by r−i the vector r without the element ri, and by ρ−i the vector ρ
without the element ρi. Denote by F : ∆R → RN the expected ﬁtness










ρj(rj). Given the signaling structure I and
the normal form game Γ, I call G(I,Γ) = {N,R,F} the expansion of Γ.
A rule ri ∈ Ri is strictly dominated if there exists some population share
ρi ∈ ∆(Ri) such that Fi(ri,ρ−i) < Fi(ρi,ρ−i) ∀ ρ−i ∈ ∆(R−i).
To get a ﬂavor of the model, I begin the analysis with a very straight forward
result that is helpful to show the extinction of dominated strategies.
7Lemma 1
If strategy si is strictly dominated in Γ by some mixed strategy ˆ σi ∈ ˆ Σi, any
rule ri with ri
si(ω) > 0 for some ω is strictly dominated in the game G(I,Γ), if
ˆ Σi is rich enough.
Proof
Assume without loss of generality that ˆ σi(si) = 0. Deﬁne for each ω ∈ Ω
the new rule ˆ ri
˜ si(ω) = ri
˜ si(ω) + ri
si(ω) · ˆ σi(˜ si) ∀ ˜ si 6= si and ˆ ri
si(ω) = 0. It is
easy to verify that ˆ ri(ω) ∈ Σi ∀ ω, however I need to assume that ˆ Σi is rich































A strategy si is iteratively strictly dominated in Γ if there exists a sequence
{sit,Γt}
n
t=0 such that sit is strictly dominated in Γt, where Γt is obtained
from Γt−1 by removing sit−1 from it−1’s set of pure strategies in Γt−1, Γ = Γ0
and si = si0. The same deﬁnition applies for a rule ri in the game G.
As a consequence of Lemma 1 one can state an analogous statement for
iteratively strictly dominated rules:
Lemma 2
If strategy si is iteratively strictly dominated in Γ by some mixed strategy
ˆ σi ∈ ˆ Σi, any rule ri with ri
si(ω) > 0 for some ω is iteratively strictly domi-
8nated in the game G(I,Γ), if ˆ Σi is rich enough.
Deﬁnition Correlated Equilibrium (c.e.)
Given I, a correlated equilibrium in Γ is a mixed rule ρ ∈ ∆R such that for
all i, Fi(ρ) ≥ Fi(˜ ρi,ρ−i) ∀ ˜ ρi ∈ ∆(Ri) . A c.e. is strict, if inequalities hold
strictly for all ˜ ρi 6= ρi and i ∈ N.
Here, an equilibrium is a point in the set of mixed rules.
Deﬁnition Induced Distribution
Let ρ ∈ ∆R be some distribution over the set of rules. Then I and ρ induce














Deﬁnition Correlated Equilibrium Distribution (c.e.d.)
A distribution λ ∈ ∆ induced by I and a c.e. ρ is a correlated equilibrium
distribution.
Given some expanded game G(I,Γ), there may exist multiple c.e. ρ, some
being strict and some other being non-strict. See Example 4.1 .
Fix some signal generating process I. Then, a mixed rule ρ ∈ ∆R is a
c.e. in Γ, if and only if ρ is a Nash equilibrium of expanded game G(I,Γ).
Note the generality of the signal space. Consider instead the special case
Ω = S and Ai = {{si × S−i}si}, that is each population gets a recommen-
dation to play a particular strategy. Kim and Wong (2007) use this signal
space. With these direct signals, it is optimal to follow the recommendation
if the signals are distributed according to a c.e.d. . However, two problems
come with this approach: ﬁrstly, even if the distribution of signals P is a
c.e.d., it might still be an equilibrium if the agents deviate from the recom-
9mendation (see example 4.1). Secondly, if one pins down a special signal
generating process, one can always construct a meta game in which agents
can condition their choice of rules on some extra signals they might receive.
The general formulation of the signal space includes such extra signals.5
Deﬁnition Evolutionary Stability (Swinkels (1992))
ρ ∈ ∆R is evolutionary stable in G(I,Γ), if ∃ 0 > 0 : ∀  ∈ (0,0) and ˜ ρ ∈ ∆R
F
i(˜ ρi,(1 − )ρ−i + ˜ ρ−i) ≥ F
i(ρi,(1 − )ρ−i + ˜ ρ−i) ⇒ ˜ ρ = ρ .
It follows immediately that a rule is evolutionary stable if and only if it is
a strict Nash equilibrium of G.6 Note that the above deﬁnition is for multi-
population (and asymmetric) games.
The deﬁnitions of evolutionary stable sets by Thomas (1985), Balkenborg
and Schlag (2001) and Cressman (2003) are all speciﬁed for symmetric one
population games. Therefore I do not list them but state a concept for gen-
eral asymmetric games:
Deﬁnition Strict Equilibrium set (SEset) (Balkenborg (1994))
A nonempty set F ⊂ ∆R is a strict equilibrium set if it is a set of Nash equi-
libria of G that is closed under mixed-rule best replies by each population i,
i.e. if for some ρ ∈ F, (˜ ρi,ρ−i) ∈ F whenever Fi(˜ ρi,ρ−i) = Fi(ρ) for each
population i.
Such a set does not need to exist, see Example 5.4.
5I am grateful to Andreu Mas-Colell to scrutinize the special signal generating process
in an earlier version of this paper.
6See Swinkels (1992), Theorem 2.
10Theorem (Balkenborg and Schlag (2007)7, Cressman (2003)8)
If F is an SESet of G, then F is a ﬁnite union of faces of ∆R. In particular,
F is closed and contains at least one pure rule r ∈ R.
2.2 Dynamic Model
We assume that at each point in time, agents update their behavior such










i, ∀ i ∈ N, (1)
where regularity presumes that g = ×i∈Ngi is (i) Lipschitz continuous on
∆R = ×i∈N∆(Ri) and (ii) gi(·,ρ) · ρi = 0 ∀ρ ∈ ∆R. By the Picard-Lindel¨ of
Theorem9, there exists a unique solution ˆ ρ(·,ρ) for each initial condition
ρ ∈ ∆R.
The following deﬁnition is taken from Hofbauer and Weibull (1996):10













k ∀ i ∈ N .









i and i ∈ N.
Clearly, the replicator dynamic is convex monotonic.
Deﬁne ρ+ = {ρ0 ∈ ∆R | ∃ t ∈ R+,ρ0 = ˆ ρ(t,ρ)}, as the subset of ∆R that is
7Proposition 2, p.299
8Theorem 3.1.2, p.71
9A function φ : X → Rk, where X ⊂ Rk, is (locally) Lipschitz continuous if for every
compact subset C ⊂ X there exists some real number λ such that it holds for all x,y ∈ C:
||φ(x)−φ(y)|| ≤ λ||x−y||. If X ⊂ Rk is open and the vector ﬁeld φ : X → Rk is Lipschitz
continuous, then the system ˙ x = φ(x) has a unique solution ˆ x(·,x0) : T → X through
every state x0 ∈ X. Moreover, ˆ x(t,x0) is continuous in t ∈ T and x0 ∈ X. (Weibull (1995)
pp.232)
10Convex monotonicity is implied by aggregate monotonicity, it is not implied by and
does not imply monotonicity (both Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Deﬁnition 3, p.369)
11reached if the dynamics start at ρ.
Deﬁnition Stability
A closed set Λ ⊆ ∆R is Lyapunov stable if for every neighborhood U0 of
Λ there exists a neighborhood U00 such that ρ+ ⊂ U0 ∀ ρ ∈ U00 ∩ ∆R.
A closed set A ⊆ ∆R is asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable
and if there exists a neighborhood U of A such that ˆ ρ(t,ρ) −→
t→∞ A for all
ρ ∈ U ∩ ∆R.
3 Propositions
This section collects the propositions.
Proposition 1
Let g be convex monotonic. If F ⊂ ∆R is a Lyapunov stable set of rest
points, then each ρ ∈ F is a c.e. .
Proof: see Appendix.
The converse of Proposition 1 is not true in general:
Fix some I and c.e. ρ in which for a population i, the rule ri ∈ Ri : ρi(ri) > 0
is weakly dominated by some mixed rule ˜ ρi. Then there exists a neighbor-
hood U of ρ such that ∀ ˜ ˜ ρ = (ρi, ˜ ˜ ρ−i) ∈ U, ˜ ˜ ρ−i ∈ int(∆R−i) it holds that
Fi(ri, ˜ ˜ ρ−i) < Fi(˜ ρi, ˜ ˜ ρ−i). Therefore, for some ˜ ˜ ρ−i there exists some ri
h ∈ Ri
with ˜ ρi(ri
h) > 0 such that Fi(ri
h, ˜ ˜ ρ−i) > Fi(ri, ˜ ˜ ρ−i). Since (1) is convex mono-
tonic, gi(ri
h, ˜ ˜ ρ) > gi(ri, ˜ ˜ ρ), contradicting Lyapunov stability.
The next propositions specify the relationship of asymptotic stability and
correlated equilibrium:
12Proposition 2 (cf Balkenborg and Schlag (2007), Theorem 6 and Cress-
man (2003), Theorem 4.5.3)
If a non-empty set F ⊂ ∆(R) of rules ρ is an asymptotically stable set of
rest points under the standard replicator dynamic, F is a SEset.
Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) and Cressman (2003) actually show equiv-
alence, if (1) is the replicator dynamic. Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) also
show the reverse for a wide class of other dynamics. I show the reverse for
the distinct class of convex monotone dynamics.11
Proposition 3
Let (1) be convex monotonic. If a set F is a SEset, then F is an asymptoti-
cally stable set of rest points.
Proof: see Appendix A.
If the process does not start in the interior of ∆R, there may exist some
ρ0 ∈ ∆R such that λ(ˆ ρ(t,ρ0)) is not a c.e.d. for all t > 0, even if an asymp-
totically stable set exists.
Proposition 4 (Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) Theorem 1)
If a rule ri ∈ Ri is iteratively strictly dominated and the process starts in the
interior of the rulespace and if the selection dynamics (1) is convex mono-
tonic, ri gets eliminated.
11In Proposition 13 Balkenborg and Schlag (2007) demand (A) that gi(ri,ρ) ≥ 0 when-
ever ri is a best response to ρ−i, (B) that gi(ri,ρ) > 0 whenever ri is a best response
to ρ−i but ρi is not and (C) that gi(ri,ρ) < 0 whenever ρi is a best response to ρ−i but
ri is not. Neither does convex monotonicity imply (A),(B) and (C) nor vice versa. Con-
sider some ρ, ˜ ρi and ri such that Fi(˜ ρi,ρ−i) > Fi(ρ) > Fi(ri,ρ−i). (A),(B),(C) imply
that gi(ri,ρ−i) = 0. From regularity I have ρi · gi(·,ρ) = 0, hence g cannot be convex
monotonic.
13We do not give a statement whether the induced distribution over outcomes
converges. Viossat (2004) shows for symmetric 3×3-games that the multipop-
ulation replicator dynamics eliminates all strategies not used in a correlated
equilibrium (with interior initial conditions), however Viossat (2007) gives
an example of a class of symmetric 4 × 4 games for which the replicator dy-
namics eliminates all strategies used in correlated equilibrium along interior
solutions. Lemma 2 and Proposition 4 allow me to pin down a weaker result,
namely to rule out iteratively strictly dominated outcomes in the induced
distribution in the long run.
Corollary
If the process starts in the interior of the rulespace and if the selection dy-
namics (1) is convex monotonic, then lim
t→∞ λ(t) attaches zero probability to
outcomes s that involve strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated, if
ˆ Σ is rich enough.
4 Examples
This section demonstrates how the model can be applied to various exam-
ples. The examples are complementary to the propositions of the preceeding
section.
4.1 A Coordination Game
This example illustrates that one signal generating process I allows for multi-
ple stable rules r,r0 that do not induce the same distribution λ over outcomes
S. Even if the signal generating process I itself is a distribution over S and
is regarded as a ‘recommendation’, other strategy choices can well be stable.















A rule for population 1 (row) assigns a strategy for the ﬁrst and the second
element of A1 respectively. UD means “choose u if ω ∈ {ul,ur} and choose
d if ω ∈ {dl,dr}”. I analogously denote the rules of population 2.
Fi =
LL LR RL RR
UU 1 P({ul,dl}) P({ur,dr}) 0
UD P({ul,ur}) P({ul,dr}) P({ur,dl}) P({dl,dr})
DU P({dl,dr}) P({dl,ur}) P({ul,dr}) P({ul,ur})
DD 0 P({ur,dr}) P({ul,dl}) 1
for
i = 1,2
The rules (UU,LL) and (DD,RR) are the strict correlated equilibria that
correspond to the pure Nash equilibria of the original game for any P with
full support. Consider P to be a uniform measure over Ω. Then, (UD,LR)
is a non-strict c.e.. For general P, the induced distribution λ does not need
to coincide with P, although it still may be a c.e.d . Suppose P({ul}) = p
and P({dr}) = 1 − p. The pair (DU,RL) is a strict c.e. and induces the
following distribution over the set of outcomes: λ(ul) = 1−p and λ(dr) = p.
4.2 Chicken
A non-Nash outcome may be asymptotically stable.














let P(ω) ≡ 1
3. Given this I, the resulting expanded game is
G(Γ,I) =

























(UD,LR) is a strict c.e., hence it is a singleton evolutionary stable rule and
therefore asymptotically stable in any convex monotonic dynamic. As is well
known, the payoﬀs generated by (UD,LR) lie outside the convex hull of the
Nash equilibria of the original game Γ.
4.3 A SEset of correlated equilibria
The chicken example above shows that a single outcome can be asymptot-
ically stable producing payoﬀs that lie outside the convex hull of the Nash
equilibrium outcomes. This example does the same for a set of outcomes.







The pure Nash equilibria are (u,r), (m,r) and (d,l), the unique mixed Nash
equilibrium is (σ1(m) = 1
3,σ1(d) = 2
3,σ2(l) = 1
3). Let Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3},
A1 = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}},A2 = {{ω1},{ω2,ω3}}, P(ω) ≡ 3. Each population
has two signals, the row population therefore has 9 rules, column has 4 rules.
The payoﬀ matrix of the expanded game is given by
16F =
LL LR RL RR
UU (0,0) (0,4) (0,2) (0,6)
UM (1,-2) (0,2) (1,0) (0,4)
UD (3,3) (-1,4) (3,5) (-1,6)
MU (2,-4) (1,0) (0,2) (0,2)
MM (3,-6) (1,-2) (2,-4) (0,0)
MD (5,-1) (0,0) (4,1) (-1,2)
DU (6,6) (2,7) (2,5) (-2,6)
DM (7,4) (2,5) (3,3) (-2,4)
DD (9,9) (1,7) (5,8) (-3,6)
.
In the ﬁgure, the shaded triangle is the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs of Γ, the thick line connecting the points (2,5) and (2,7) represents
the SEset F = {ρ ∈ ∆(R) | ρ1(DM) = 1 − ρ1(DU),ρ2(LR) = 1}, which is
not fully contained in the convex hull.
4.4 Matching Pennies
Non-existence of SEset.






Let the information structure be given by a singleton Ω = {ω}, in other words
let there be no signals. Therefore the rules coincide with the strategies. The
set of Nash equilibria of G has only one element which is not strict (and





that has a common prior induces an
expanded game G{I,Γ} which has no SEset. If instead of P there would exist
some subjective priors {P i}i∈I with P i : Ai → R violating the common prior
assumption, it would be straightforward to construct an expansion of Γ with
strict equilibria, see Aumann and Dreze (2005), example 6.5 .
5 Subpopulations
In this section, I illustrate that the model of Lenzo and Sarver (2006) can be
expressed as a special case of the general formulation of the model presented
in this paper. I give a special interpretation of the signals: a signal assigns
one of ﬁnitely many subpopulations to each agent. Let each population i have
a set of subpopulations Mi = {mi
1,...,mi




si the share of agents in subpopulation mi that choose strategy si. Let
η ∈ ∆(M) be a probability distribution over M, with η(mi,·) > 0 ∀mi ∈ Mi
and i ∈ N. Note that this distribution may be correlated and that there
may be matches m ∈ M that receive zero-probability.
We show that given a game Γ, for any M,η with state x, there is an I
and a state ρ such that the induced distributions are the same. One can
represent any state x of the subpopulations model by a state ρ of our model
if one gives a particular speciﬁcation of the signalling structure. Furthermore
18we show that ρ needs not to be unique and that the dynamic properties of x
and ρ need not be the same.









Firstly we show that
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12More precisely: ri(mi) = ri(mi,m−i) for some m−i (ri(mi,m−i) has the same value
∀ m−i).




















































From the third line of the calculation of
P
ri∈Ri













k) = 1 and have the desired result that the distributions over
outcomes are the same. However, there is no one-to-one mapping from one









2}, η(m) = 1









2 = 1, in words: for each population i all agents of subpopulation
1 choose their strategy 1 and all agents from subpopulation 2 choose their












(and A2 analogous), P = η and ρ as constructed above, there is probability




2. Alternatively, but for
the same Ω, Ai, P, one could assign ˜ ρi(ri) = 1
4 ∀ ri ∈ Ri. Both ρ and ˜ ρ
induce the same distribution λ but while ρ is pure, ˜ ρ is completely mixed
and therefore ρ and ˜ ρ have diﬀerent dynamic properties.
6 Robust Signals
Until now, it was assumed that the signal generating process is stationary.
This is plausible, if the signals originate from an object that is completely
exogenous, i.e. if they are independent from interaction – a somehow polar
case. The other polar case would be that the agents themselves can choose
20messages that serve as signals. I regard situations in which one population
i can alter the complete signal and consider the case in which population i
can choose a particular probability distribution P. I oﬀer the following inter-
pretation: suppose some institution determines P. Every population knows
the design of the institution and therefore has access to the information how
the institution determines P. Population i can inﬂuence the institution, be-
cause – for example – some key positions within the institution are held
by members of population i. In this section we derive conditions such that
population i does not have an incentive to change P in a stable state ρ.
Suppose nature draws a certain elementary event ω ∈ Ω. Then, for a given
distribution of rules ρ = {ρi}i, population i’s expost payoﬀ is fi(ρ(ω)). Pop-
ulation i has an incentive to change P if there is some other event ω0 with
fi(ρ(ω)) < fi(ρ(ω0)). This leads to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition Robust to Manipulation
Given ρ, P ∈ ∆(Ω) is robust to manipulation if for all populations i




0 ∈ Ω .
If a distribution P is robust to manipulation given ρ, no population (re-
gardless wether it has the capability to change P or not) has an incentive
to manipulate P. We do not demand that any population can change P.
We characterize those pairs (P,ρ) such that no population wants to change
P given ρ. Nevertheless, we have implicitly assumed some constrained rea-
soning. Suppose there is some mapping g : ∆(Ω) ⇒ ∆(R) such that given
distribution P, agents play an equilibrium ρ ∈ g(P). In the approach above,
agents believe g to be singlevalued and constant and agents compare the ex-
post payoﬀs. Alternatively, one could argue that population i does not have
an incentive to change P to P 0 if Fi
P(ρ) ≥ Fi
P0(ρ0) ∀ ρ0 ∈ g(P 0). That is, no
population has an incentive to change P, if P maximizes ex-ante payoﬀs for
all equilibrium choices ρ0, where the equilibrium choice well depends on the
21distribution P. The consequences of this deﬁnition are more exclusive in the
sense that it is easy to ﬁnd a game such that no stable state ρ has a robust
distribution P.13
6.1 Results
Consider again the general setting, with Γ = {N,S,f},
I = {{Ω,P(Ω),P},{A}i∈N} yielding the expanded game GP = {N,R,FP}
(making the dependence on P explicit). Deﬁne ∆∼
P ⊂ ∆(R) as the set of
rules ρ such that P is robust to manipulation. Deﬁne ∆CE
P ⊂ ∆(R) as the




P 6= ∅ ∀ P ∈ ∆(Ω).
Proof
Consider a Nash equilibrium σ ∈ ∆(S) of the original game Γ. Deﬁne the
rule ρ such that for all i ∈ N and si ∈ Si, ρi(ri) = σi(si) for ri : ri(ω) ≡ si.
Clearly, ρ is a correlated equilibrium of Γ given P, hence ρ ∈ ∆CE
P . No
population conditions the choice of strategies on signals, hence fi(ρ(ω)) =
fi(σ) ∀ω ∈ Ω and therefore no population has an incentive to manipulate
the generation of the signals. Hence, P is robust given ρ, ρ ∈ ∆∼
P. 
We argue that there always is a trivial correlated equilibrium in which agents
choose Nash equilibrium strategies ignoring any signals. Since all agents ig-
nore any signals, no agent has an incentive to manipulate the signals.
We cannot give a full characterization of ∆∼
P ∩ ∆CE
P , the set of correlated
equilibria given P that induce P to be robust against manipulation. How-
13For example, the chicken game, the battle of the sexes game,...
22ever, I suspect that it is a subset of rules that induce a distribution λ on
the set of outcomes S that lies in the convex hull of Nash equilibria (see the
Chicken Game example below). I leave this characterization to future work.
We can give a full characterization of ∆∼
P ∩ FP, FP being an asymptoti-
cally stable set of rules given P if we impose a further assumption on the
payoﬀs of the original game Γ. Suppose Γ has the generic property that
fi(s) 6= fi(s0) ∀s,s0 ∈ S,s 6= s0. Then all asymptotically stable sets are
singleton. In this case, I can state that a probability measure P is robust
to manipulation given ρ if and only if ρ puts probability one on rules that
choose one strict Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6
Suppose for each population i, the frequency ρi(ri) updates according to (1)
and that (1) is convex monotonic. Suppose further that the original game
Γ is generic. A set FP ⊂ ∆(R) is asymptotically stable given (1) and a
distribution P with full support on Ω, and P is robust given a ρ ∈ FP, if and
only if ρ attaches probability one to a rule that maps all signals to the same
strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof
Suppose FP is asymptotically stable and suppose P is robust given any
ρ ∈ FP. According to Proposition 2, FP is a SEset, from genericity follows
that FP is singleton, i.e. ρ = FP puts probability one to a strict correlated
equilibrium r ∈ R. Because no population has an incentive to manipulate
P given r, it must be that fi(r(ω)) = fi(r(ω0)) ∀ω,ω0 ∈ Ω,∀ i. Since Γ is
generic, it must be r(ω) = r(ω0) = s ∀ ω,ω0 ∈ Ω and some s ∈ S. Since
r is a strict correlated equilibrium, Fi(r(ω)) > Fi(˜ ri(ω),r−i(ω)) ∀ ˜ ri 6=
ri,∀ ω,∀ i ⇒ fi(s) > fi(˜ si,s−i) ∀ ˜ si ∈ Si, ∀ i. s is a strict Nash equilbrium
of Γ. 
23Suppose ρ attaches probability one to a rule r ∈ R that maps all sig-
nals to a strict Nash equilibrium s ∈ S of Γ, r(ω) = s ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Then
fi(r(ω)) = fi(r(ω0)) ∀ ω,ω0 ∈ Ω,∀ i and no population has an incentive to
manipulate P. Further Fi(r) > Fi(˜ ri,r−i)) ∀˜ ri ∈ Ri ∀ i, ie r is a strict
correlated equilbrium. From Proposition 3, r is asymptotically stable. 
Proposition 6 claims that if the game Γ is generic, i.e. if one considers
the payoﬀs as random draws and disregards those payoﬀs that appear with
probability zero, if the agents update their rules boundedly rational and if no
population would have an incentive to change the signal generating process
if it could, then there is nothing we can learn from the concept of corre-
lated equilibrium. Strict Nash equilibria suﬃciently explain behavior under
such conditions. The proof makes use of the fact that in generic games no
two outcomes provide the same payoﬀ. If a population has the capacity to
choose certain signals at will, the population will do so as to maximize ex
post payoﬀs.
6.2 Example: Chicken Game
We elaborate on this subject for the Chicken example, for which we can char-
acterize ∆∼
P∩∆CE
P . Let Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3} and A1 = {{ω1,ω2},{ω3}} and A2 =
{{ω1},{ω2,ω3}}. Consider a P ∈ ∆(Ω) with full support. The Chicken game
is generic, all asymptotically stable sets are singleton and therefore strict cor-
related equilibria. We list the expected payoﬀs and the best replies in Ap-
pendix B. For any P, there exist two strict correlated equilibria: (uu,rr) and
(dd,ll). If P(ω1) > max





, also (ud,rl) is a strict








there exists a fourth strict correlated equilibrium: (du,lr). The equilibria
(uu,rr) and (dd,ll) correspond to the two strict Nash equilibria of Γ. In these
equilibria, ex ante payoﬀs F equal ex post payoﬀs f(ω) for any signal ω, no
24population has an incentive to manipulate the generation of signals. Suppose
P is such that (ud,rl) is a strict equilibrium. Then, the ex ante payoﬀs for
population 1 are 6−4P(ω1)+P(ω3). Population 1 has an incentive to increase
P(ω3) at the expense of P(ω1). After the manipulation, either P is outside
the region in which (ud,rl) is a strict correlated equilibrium or the incentives
to manipulate P are still intact. Note that population 2 also has incentives
to manipulate P in the equilibrium (ud,rl). Analogous arguments hold for
the equilibrium (du,lr). Wrapping up we get that P is robust given the rules
r ∈ {(uu,ll),(dd,rr)} and that these are the only states that are asymptot-
ically stable. Note that there are other correlated equilibria, that are not
asymptotically stable, that are generated by a robust P: ∆∼
P ∩ ∆CE
P = {ρ ∈
∆(R) |ρ1 = (1
3 + ρ1(rr), 1
3 − ρ1(dd), 1
3 − ρ1(dd),ρ1(dd)),ρ2 = (1
3 + ρ2(rr), 1
3 −
ρ2(rr), 1
3 − ρ2(rr),ρ2(rr)), ρ1(dd),ρ2(rr) ∈ [0, 1
3]} ∪ {(uu,rr),(dd,ll)}. For
any mixed correlated equilibrium ρ with a robust P, each population gets
a payoﬀ of 42
3, which is the outcome of the mixed Nash-equilibrium of the
original Chicken game. To conclude for the Chicken game: if agents have the
capability to inﬂuence the signal generating process, and if the distriution P
and the distribution of rules ρ is such that agents do neither have an incen-
tive to manipulate the signals nor to change their behavior, the outcome is
a Nash outcome.
7 Conclusions
In Aumann (1987), section 3, a player receives a signal and conditions her
strategic choice within a normal form game on this signal. She takes into
account that other players receive signals that are potentially correlated to
hers and calculates conditional beliefs. Aumann (1987) shows that, if players
have a common prior on the signal space and if players choose strategies opti-
mally given their beliefs, the equilibrium outcome is a correlated equilibrium.
There are correlated equilibrium outcomes that lie outside the convex hull
25of the Nash outcomes. In this chapter I pursue the question whether agents
can achieve a correlated equilibrium without being capable to calculate con-
ditional expectations, indeed even without being able to optimize. For this
purpose, given a signal generating process and a game in strategic form, I
deﬁne an “expanded game” whose strategies are mappings from the set of the
signals to the set of the strategies of the original game. For this expanded
game I transfer existing and well established results on regular monotonic
dynamics, including the replicator dynamic. Applying a result of Samuel-
son and Zhang (1992), it follows that an outcome which supports a strictly
dominated strategy of the original game receives zero weight in the limit.
Analogous to results of Weibull (1995) and Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) I
show that a Lyapunov stable state of the expanded game represents a corre-
lated equilibrium of the original game and that such a state is asymptotically
stable if and only if it represents a strict correlated equilibrium (also Swinkels
(1992)). Furthermore, I make use of the setwise concept “strict equilibrium
set” introduced by Balkenborg (1994) and provide a result for convex mono-
tonic dynamics that is analogous to Cressman (2003) and Balkenborg and
Schlag (2007): a set of restpoints is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a
strict correlated equilibrium set. Therefore I can give a positive answer to the
initial question: even if agents are extreme boundedly rational a non-Nash
outcome can be robust to random perturbations if agents use simple rules
that condition their behavior on observed signals. Finally I discuss endoge-
nous signals. If behavior of the agents can be modelled by convex monotonic
dynamics and if the game is generic, I show that an asymptotically stable
state has a robust distribution of signals if and only if it corresponds to a
strict Nash equilibrium of the original game. I suspect that if the (potentially
only Lyapunov stable) state is a correlated equilibrium and if the distribution
of signals is robust, then the expected payoﬀs lie in the convex hull of those
produced by Nash equilibria. I illustrate this claim for the Chicken game.
This is not the ﬁrst attempt linking evolutionary concepts to that of
26correlated equilibria. Cripps (1991) constructs a model in which nature ran-
domly assigns roles to players in bi-matrix games. Analyzing the statics of
the model, he shows that ESS in the symmetrized game represent strict cor-
related equilibria. Lenzo and Sarver (2006) deﬁne a model of subpopulations
in which an agent of some subpopulation is non-uniformly matched to agents
in other subpopulations. I show that any kind of their subpopulation match-
ing may be represented by a particular signalling structure of our model.
Kim and Wong (2007) deﬁne an evolutionary stable correlated strategy for
symmetric 2 × 2 games.
Appendix
Proposition 1
Let g be convex monotonic. If F ⊂ ∆R is a Lyapunov stable set of rest
points, then each ρ ∈ F is a c.e. .
Proof: Since ρ ∈ F is a restpoint, gi(ri,ρ) = 0 ∀ ri ∈ supp (ρi). Sup-
pose ∃ri
l,ri
k ∈ supp(ρi) such that Fi(ri
l,ρ−i) > Fi(ri
k,ρ−i). Then, by convex
monotonicity, gi(ri
k,ρ) < gi(ri





k ∈ supp(ρi). If ρ is in the interior of F with respect to
∆R, we are done. Suppose instead that for some i there exists ri
k 6∈ supp(ρi)
and suppose that Fi(ri




ri∈Ri gi(ri,ρ) · ρi(ri) = 0. Since g is (Lipschitz–)continuous,
there exists a neighborhood U of ρ such that gi(ri
k, ˜ ρ) > 0 ∀ ˜ ρ ∈ U ∩ ∆R.
Deﬁne U0 = {˜ ρ ∈ U ∩ ∆R | ˜ ρi(ri
k) > 0}. It holds that ˆ ρi
ri
k(t, ˜ ρ) is strictly
increasing in t for any ˜ ρ ∈ U0. However, Lyapunov stability implies that
ˆ ρ(t, ˜ ρ) ∈ U0 ∀ t ≥ 0 and ˜ ρ ∈ U00 for some neighborhood U00, which can
only be the case if ˙ ˜ ρi(ri
k) ≤ 0 for some ˜ ρ ∈ U0, because ρi(ri
k) = 0. Since
gi(ri
k, ˜ ρ) > 0 ∀ ˜ ρ ∈ U0 this is not true for any subset of U0 and U00 does not
exist. Therefore, the existence of some ri
k ∈ Ri for some i ∈ N such that
27Fi(ri
k,ρ−i) > Fi(ρ) contradicts Lyapunov stability of F and we have estab-
lished the claim. 
Proposition 3
Let (1) be convex monotonic. If a set F is a SEset, then F is an asymptoti-
cally stable set of rest points.
Proof: Suppose F is an SEset and suppose that F 6= ∆R. Each point
in F is a restpoint of (1). Further we have that F is a ﬁnite union of
faces of ∆R and therefore is closed. Consider some ρ∗ on the boundary
of F with respect to ∆R. For some population there is a pure rule ri such
that Fi(ri,ρ−i
∗ ) < Fi(ρ∗). Since gi(·,ρ) · ρi = 0 ∀ ρ ∈ ∆R it follows that
gi(ri,ρ∗) = 0 ∀ ri ∈ supp(ρi
∗). From convex monotonicity we have that
gi(ri,ρ∗) < 0 ∀ ri 6∈ supp(ρi
∗) and from continuity follows that there exists
some neighborhood U : U ∩ int(∆R) 6= ∅ of ρ∗ such that gi(ri,ρ) < 0 ∀ ri 6∈
supp(ρi
∗),ρ ∈ U. Therefore ˙ ρi
ri(ρ) < 0 ∀ri 6∈ supp(ρi
∗),∀ ρ ∈ U \ F and from
gi(·,ρ)·ρi = 0 I have for at least one ri ∈ supp(ρi
∗) that ˙ ρi
ri(ρ) > 0 ∀ ρ ∈ U\F,
which establishes the result. 
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